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OYSTER MORTALITY DUE TO FRESHWATER 
DIVERSIONS IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON 
RESPONSE EFFORT: ARE TAKINGS CLAIMS 
VIABLE? 
Catherine M. Janasie* 
Many private parties sustained damage after the Deepwater Horizon 
incident on April 20, 2010 (the Spill).  Since the Spill, many of these 
parties have attempted to recover their losses, and the news recently has 
been filled with stories detailing the settlement of some of these claims.1  
After the Spill, British Petroleum (BP) set up the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility, which paid over $6 billion before it was replaced with a court-
supervised claims process in June 2012.2  The U.S. District Court in 
Louisiana recently approved a settlement in the Spill’s multi-district 
litigation.3  While there is a $2.3 billion cap on the claims that BP will 
pay to seafood vessel owners, seafood boat crews and captains, 
commercial fishermen, and oyster leaseholders, other claims are not 
                                            
 * Ocean and Coastal Law Fellow at the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal 
Program, University of Mississippi School of Law; L.L.M., Lewis & Clark Law School; 
J.D., Rutgers University School of Law.  Research for this article was made possible by 
funding for the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program under award number 
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 1. See, e.g., Judge OKs Settlement in BP Class-Action Suit, CNN (Dec. 22, 2012, 1:50 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/22/us/bp-spill-settlement/index.html?iref=allsearch 
[hereinafter Judge OKs Settlement]; Tom Fowler, Transocean Is Set to Pay $1.4 Billion in 
Gulf Spill, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324374004578219533349270970. 
 2. Michael Kunzelman, BP Oil Spill Payments Exceed $1B Mark, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 10, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/bp-oil-spill-
settlement-payments-exceed-1b-mark-0. 
 3. See id. 
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capped.4  Through this settlement, BP estimates that it will pay out more 
than $7.8 billion of the $20 billion trust to resolve all the claims.5   
The U.S. government has also settled some of its civil and criminal 
cases from the Spill.6  In November 2012, BP settled with the U.S. 
Department of Justice to plead guilty to criminal charges and pay $4.5 
billion in fines, one of largest criminal fines ever imposed by the U.S. 
government against a corporation.7  In addition, BP faces additional 
Clean Water Act claims that were not included in the settlement with the 
Department of Justice.8  Transocean Ltd., who owned the rig that 
exploded, recently settled with the U.S. Department of Justice to pay 
$1.4 billion to cover all federal civil and criminal charges against the 
company.9 
Among those parties who sustained damage as a result of the Spill 
are oystermen who raise and harvest oysters in the Gulf of Mexico 
(Gulf).10  Oysters are in a unique position in the Gulf.  In addition to 
being an economic commodity, oysters are a keystone species and 
provide ecosystem services such as filtering water.11  Unfortunately, the 
Spill occurred when oysters were spawning, so the oyster population was 
likely very damaged by the Spill.12  However, much of the oyster 
mortality is being attributed to the decision to flush freshwater into the 
Gulf as part of the response effort, and not due to oil from the Spill.13   
The State of Louisiana decided to use its freshwater diversion system 
in an attempt to keep oil out of the state’s coastal marshes and 
wetlands.14  Louisiana and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began to 
                                            
 4. Judge OKs Settlement, supra note 1.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Clifford Krause & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/global/16iht-
bp16.html?pagewanted=all. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Fowler, supra note 1.  
 10. MIKE FREEMAN, STEPHEN GIDIERE & MARY SAMUELS, THE OIL SPILL’S IMPACT ON 
GULF COAST OYSTERS 1 (2010), available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/na_40-
11/40.11097.pdf.    
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 1-2. 
 13. Id. at 1. Throughout my research, I encountered “freshwater” spelled in two ways: 
“freshwater” and “fresh water.”  Except when I am quoting or referencing sources, I will 
use the “freshwater” spelling. 
 14. Nicole Santa Cruz & P.J. Huffstutter, Effort to Keep Oil Spill at Bay Tips 
Ecological Balance, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/ 
03/nation/la-na-freshwater-20100803. 
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flush unprecedented amounts of freshwater into Louisiana’s coastal 
waters beginning ten days after the Spill.15  Most parties concur that the 
freshwater diversions lowered the salinity level in Louisiana’s coastal 
marshes, and that the lower salinity levels led to massive amounts of 
oyster mortality in these areas.16  However, disagreement exists as to the 
effectiveness of the freshwater diversions.17  In addition, although most 
parties acknowledge that the freshwater diversions attributed to a drop of 
salinity that led to oyster mortality, some parties are claiming that the 
freshwater diversions were only one of several factors that caused 
salinity levels to drop in Louisiana’s coastal waters.18   
Ironically, these diversion systems were planned and completed by 
the state of Louisiana and the federal government partly at the request of 
the oyster industry.19  The freshwater diversion systems were built as part 
of an effort to protect and preserve Louisiana’s coastline and remain part 
of Louisiana’s coastal restoration plan.20  Louisiana continues to use 
freshwater diversions to prevent further coastal erosion and salt water 
intrusion, as well as “to maintain and enhance the existing ecological 
framework” of Louisiana’s coastal areas.21    
This article will look at possible recovery available against Louisiana 
and the federal government for oyster harvesters and distributors for 
damage done to their leased oyster beds by the freshwater diversions 
after the Spill.  As stated above, oyster leaseholders had the option to 
join the $2.3 billion settlement for the seafood industry in the multi-
district litigation.22  Similarly, oyster leaseholders could have submitted 
claims to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.23  However, this article will 
                                            
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Jeffrey Ball, Fresh Water Aimed at Oil Kills Oysters, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704720004575377503611992306.html. 
 19. Chris Kirkham, Louisiana Oyster Industry Struggles to Cope with Oil Spill, Coastal 
Restoration Efforts, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 31, 2010, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/10/louisiana_oyster_industry_stru.html. 
 20. COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF LOUISIANA, PROJECTS, 
http://www.coastal.la.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&nid=78&pnid=0&pi
d=97&catid=0&elid=0 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) [hereinafter PROJECTS]. 
 21. COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF LOUISIANA, PROJECT 
SUMMARY FOR THE DAVIS POND FRESHWATER DIVERSION, http://sonris-
www.dnr.state.la.us/sundown/cart_prod/cart_ocpr_project_summary?pattask_proj_id=a2
b200bf7eb32e94e040007f01005d75&popen_in_attask=N&phide_merged_fields=N (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2013) [hereinafter PROJECT SUMMARY DAVIS POND DIVERSION]. 
 22. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
 23. See id.  
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look at the ability of oyster leaseholders in Louisiana to bring takings 
claims under the U.S. and Louisiana constitutions.24   
Part I will discuss the history of oysters and freshwater diversions in 
Louisiana.  Part II of this article will discuss the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster and the freshwater diversions, including how the diversions 
impacted oysters.  Part III will briefly discuss the other forms of recovery 
available to the oystermen. 25  Part IV will discuss the recovery under 
state and federal law for takings claims.  Part V will analyze whether 
these takings claims could be successful. 
I. HISTORY OF OYSTERS AND FRESHWATER DIVERSIONS IN LOUISIANA 
Oysters play an integral role in the Gulf ecosystem.26  As a keystone 
species, oysters have “a shaping, disproportionate influence on [their] 
habitat and community.”27  In addition, oysters work to purify the water 
in their habitat, as they can filter at least a gallon of water in an hour,28 
and between twenty-five to fifty gallons in a day.29  Further, oyster reefs 
serve as habitat and nursery grounds for other species in the ecosystem.30  
Oyster reefs also keep down coastal erosion because the reefs form 
ridges on the sea bottom, which minimize tidal impacts and waves.31  
Finally, oysters serve as a food source for other species in the ecosystem, 
including birds.32 
In addition to their vital importance to the Gulf’s ecosystem, oysters 
are also an extremely vital economic commodity.33  NOAA reported that 
in 2008, Gulf fishermen harvested over one billion pounds of shellfish 
and finfish that yielded $659 million in revenue.34  The Gulf is the 
                                            
 24. Additional claims may be available to oyster leaseholders under state or federal 
law, but these claims are beyond the scope of this paper.  Further, this paper will not 
address the recovery available under the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, pursuant to the terms 
of the Oil Pollution Act. 
 25. In this article, the term “oystermen” refers to men and women who make their 
living producing and harvesting oysters in the Gulf. 
 26. NAT’L  COMM’N ON BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER, THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 178 
(2011) [hereinafter DEEP WATER REPORT].  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Freeman, Gidiere & Samuels, supra note 10, at 1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 186-7.  
 34. Id. at 187. 
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leading producer of the nation’s oysters, with NOAA reporting that 
Louisiana itself accounts for sixty-seven percent of the country’s oyster 
production.35  All in all, oysters produce around $131 million in annual 
revenue for the Gulf Coast region.36  In addition to loss of revenue due to 
physical harm and the seafood harvesting closures that occurred after the 
Spill, many in the region are concerned with the lack of consumer 
confidence in Gulf seafood after the Spill.37  Because of lower salinity 
levels and oil from the Spill, oyster production from January to June 
2010 was down fifty-seven percent compared to averages from 2007 to 
2009, and the dockside value loss for the same time period was forty-
four percent.38 
A. Oyster Leases in Louisiana 
Under Louisiana law, oyster leases are recognizable property rights, 
so that oyster leases have legal attributes similar to other real property 
and are protectable against injuries by third parties.39  Under Louisiana 
law, “[a] lessee shall enjoy the exclusive use of the water bottoms leased 
and of all oysters and cultch grown or placed thereon.”40  However, the 
statute goes on to state that an oyster lessee’s 
exclusive use of water bottoms is subordinate to the rights or 
responsibilities of the state, any political subdivision of the state, 
the United States, or any agency or agent thereof, to take any 
action in furtherance of coastal protection, conservation, or 
restoration. For purposes of this Subpart, ‘coastal protection, 
conservation, or restoration’ means any project, plan, act, or 
activity for the protection, conservation, restoration, 
enhancement, creation, preservation, nourishment, maintenance, 
or management of the coast, coastal resources, coastal wetlands, 
and barrier shorelines or islands, including but not limited to 
projects authorized under any comprehensive coastal protection 
master plan or annual coastal protection plan issued pursuant to 
                                            
 35. Id. 
 36. Freeman, Gidiere & Samuels, supra note 10, at 1. 
 37. DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 185. 
 38. Natalia Real, Louisiana Oyster Industry Struggling the Most, FISH INFO & SERVICE CO. 
(Oct. 1, 2010, 3:30 PM), http://fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0& 
special=&monthyear=&day=&id=38392&ndb=1&df=0. 
 39. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:423(A) (2006). 
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Part II of Chapter 2 of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes 
of 1950.41 
The statute allows an oyster lessee to make a claim for damage or injury 
done to the oyster beds or grounds of the lease, but states once again that 
the lessee may not bring an action “against the state, any political 
subdivision of the state, the United States, or any agency, agent, 
contractor, or employee thereof for any claim arising from any project, 
plan, act, or activity in relation to coastal protection, conservation, or 
restoration, except as provided in R.S. 56:427.1.”42   
The State of Louisiana and any of its political subdivisions, along 
with the United States, may not be held liable for coastal restoration 
actions, including any claims arising from freshwater diversions “for the 
purpose of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration.”43  In 
addition, Louisiana law requires all oyster leases to contain “hold-
harmless” language to this effect.44  
In addition to private oyster leases, Louisiana law also establishes 
public oyster seed grounds for the oyster industry’s use and benefit.45  A 
person may take mature oysters, seed oysters, or cultch from the public 
seed grounds for their own use or benefit.46  However, to do so, the 
person must obtain a permit from the state.47 
B. History of Louisiana’s Diversion System and the Oyster Industry 
Ironically, the diversion system that many believe caused oyster 
mortality after the Spill was built in part because of requests by the 
oyster industry.48  Historically, Louisiana’s coastal waters provided an 
ideal habitat and salinity for oysters, since the freshwater from the 
Mississippi River and other smaller streams mixed with the Gulf’s 
saltwater.49  However, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) 
expanded the levee system of the Mississippi after the flood of 1927 in 
                                            
 41. Id.  
 42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:423(B) (2006). 
 43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:427.1(A) (2006). 
 44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:427.1(B) (2006). 
 45. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:434 (2006). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Avenal v. Louisiana, 886 So.2d 1085, 1088 (La. 2004). 
 49. Id. 
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an effort to prevent future major floods of the Mississippi River.50  
However, by controlling the flooding of the Mississippi River with the 
levee system, freshwater no longer reached these coastal areas, which 
raised the salinity level in these waters.51  The increased salinity had two 
effects: (1) areas landward that had previously had salinity levels that 
were too low for oyster cultivation now could support oyster growth; and 
(2) areas from the coast that had previously been ideal for oyster 
cultivation were now too saline to support oyster growth.52  In addition, 
the Mississippi River levee system led to coastal erosion and the loss of 
wetlands along Louisiana’s coast.53 
In the 1950s, the federal and state governments began to address 
these effects and plan a diversion system to reintroduce the Mississippi 
River’s freshwater back into the effected coastal waters.54  At the request 
of local groups, which included the oyster industry, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (the FWS) began an investigation into the effects of the 
Mississippi levee system.55  In 1959, the FWS issued a memorandum to 
the Corps that stated that natural and man-made events had raised the 
salinity in these coastal waters, which had an adverse effect on the fish 
and wildlife of the area, including oysters.56  In the 1959 memorandum, 
the FWS concluded that “[i]ntroduction of fresh water to reestablish 
natural patterns of salinity . . . would provide the most effective method 
of restoring fish and wildlife production.”57  In addition, the 1959 
memorandum also recognized that the increased salinity had made some 
waters that had previously been too fresh suitable for oyster growth.58  
Finally, the 1959 memorandum identified four locations for diversion 
sites, including in the areas that had previously been too fresh for oyster 
cultivation.59 
Through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Corps continued to work 
with the Louisiana state government on planning the freshwater 
                                            
 50. Id.  For a discussion of the history of the Mississippi River levee system and flood 
control in the area, see KAREN M. O’NEILL, RIVERS BY DESIGN: STATE POWER AND THE 
ORIGINS OF U.S. FLOOD CONTROL (2006). 
 51. Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1088.  
 52. Id. at 1088-89. 
 53. See id. at 1089. 
 54. Id. at 1088. 
 55. Id. at 1088-89. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1089. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
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diversion system.60  In the 1970s, coastal erosion and increased salinity 
levels continued in these areas, which continued to move the areas for 
oyster growth further landward, while making previously vital oyster 
grounds unusable, including Louisiana’s public seed grounds.61  The 
Corps prepared an Environmental Impact Statement in 1984, proposing 
the construction of three diversion structures to control salinity and 
recognizing that “the zone where conditions will become too fresh for 
oyster cultivation as a result of the diversion coincides with an area that 
was historically (prior to 1960) too fresh and not favorable for oyster 
cultivation.”62  Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, the planned diversions 
were constructed and became operational.63 
The freshwater diversion system continues to be part of Louisiana’s 
coastal restoration plan.64  Louisiana uses the freshwater diversion 
system to slow the intrusion of saltwater and aid marsh growth in coastal 
Louisiana in an effort “to maintain and enhance the existing ecological 
framework” of Louisiana’s coastal areas by providing freshwater, 
sediment, and nutrients.65    
Louisiana has anticipated continued tension between its use of 
freshwater diversions and its effect on the oyster industry.66  As 
discussed above, in response to the operation of the freshwater diversion 
system, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) 
inserted a clause into its oyster lease form that indemnifies and holds 
harmless Louisiana for all claims related to the state’s coastal restoration 
actions.67  Further, because Louisiana plans to continue using freshwater 
diversions in its coastal restoration plans, Governor Jindal formed the 
Oyster Advisory Committee, in part to address the oyster damage due to 
the Spill and the freshwater diversions, and in part to address the 
potential future conflicts between the oyster industry and freshwater 
diversions initiated for coastal restoration purposes.68 
                                            
 60. Id. at 1089-90. 
 61. Id. at 1089. 
 62. Id. at 1090. 
 63. Id. at 1090-92. 
 64. PROJECTS, supra note 20. 
 65. PROJECT SUMMARY DAVIS POND DIVERSION, supra note 21. 
 66. Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1090. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Kirkham, supra note 19. 
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II. THE OIL SPILL AND THE FRESHWATER DIVERSIONS 
On April 20, 2010 an explosion on the drilling rig the Deepwater 
Horizon, which was operating in the Gulf of Mexico (the Gulf) for BP, 
caused one of history’s greatest oil spills.69  After eighty-six days of oil 
gushing into the Gulf, BP finally claimed that it had capped the Macondo 
well in July 2010.70  In September, five months after the Spill, pressure 
tests determined that the pumping of cement into the well’s base formed 
a final seal, and the federal government declared that the Macondo well 
was dead.71 
All in all, scientists for the government have estimated that around 
five million barrels of oil gushed into the Gulf from the Macondo well.72  
The oil reached the shores of Louisiana first, and tar balls and oil mousse 
made it to the shores of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida by June.73  
The Gulf is the home of an extremely rich and productive ecosystem, and 
the Spill threatened to damage these resources.74  In the aftermath of the 
Spill, the media inundated the American public with images of oil-
slicked waterways and oil-covered wildlife; however, very little coverage 
was given to another negative consequence of the Spill response – 
freshwater diversions from the Mississippi River into the bays of 
Louisiana.75 
A. The Freshwater Diversions 
In an attempt to keep oil from the Spill from reaching the coast of 
Louisiana, Louisiana and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began to 
flush freshwater into Barataria Bay and Breton Sound.76  The freshwater 
diversions began ten days after the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon 
                                            
 69. Campbell Robertson, U.S. Puts Oil Spill Total at Nearly 5 Million Barrels, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03flow.html. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 174.  
 75. See, e.g., 100 Days of the BP Spill: A Timeline, TIME, http://content.time.com/ 
time/interactive/0,31813,2006455,00.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (an interactive 
timeline containing multiple images of the oil spill but no mention of damage from 
freshwater diversions);  Huff Post: Gulf Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/bp-oil-spill/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (A 
collection of stories covering the spill including many images of oil in the marshes but 
containing no stories on the damage done by the freshwater diversions). 
 76. Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14.  
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rig, on April 30, 2010.77  According to a coastal scientist in Louisiana, 
these diversions were a preferred response measure because they were a 
low-cost solution that would not require any funds from either BP or the 
federal government.78  The diversions were accomplished by releasing 
large quantities of river water through gates along the Mississippi River 
levees and man-made channels into Louisiana’s coastal marshes.79  The 
freshwater was released through this system in larger quantities than had 
been released by the system in the past.80   
Louisiana opened the Davis Pond and Caernarvon diversions, the 
state’s largest two diversions, on April 30, 2010.81  On May 4, 2010 
Louisiana opened the Ostrica Locks to flush additional freshwater into 
Breton Sound.82  On May 7, 2010, the Louisiana Office of Coastal 
Protection and Restoration (OCPR) announced that six diversions with a 
combined flow of 18,900 cubic feet along the lower Mississippi had been 
opened in order to keep oil from getting to Louisiana’s wetlands and 
estuaries.83  On May 10, 2010, OCPR announced that the Davis Pond 
diversion had been opened to full capacity.84  On May 12, 2010, OCPR 
announced that a seventh diversion had been opened, and the total 
combined flow of these diversions was 29,550 cubic feet per second.85  
The following are the seven diversions that were opened: 
                                            
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  The solution was low-cost because a freshwater diversion system already 
existed in Louisiana, which will be discussed in Part III. 
 79. Jeffrey Ball, supra note 18. 
 80. Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14. 
 81. See Press Release, State of Louisiana, Office of Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Officials Open Additional Freshwater Diversions to Help Protect Coastal 
Wetlands from Oil Spill (May 7, 2010), available at 
http://emergency.louisiana.gov/Releases/05072010-cpra.html [hereinafter Press Release, 
Additional Freshwater Diversions].  “The Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration is 
the implementation office for the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority.”  Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Press Release, State of Louisiana, Office of Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Officials Open Davis Pond Diversion to Full Capacity to Help Curb Oil 
Penetration into Coastal Marshes (May 10, 2010), available at 
http://emergency.louisiana.gov/Releases/05102010-ocpr.html [hereinafter Press Release, 
Davis Pond Diversion].  
 85. See Press Release, State of Louisiana, State Opens Additional Freshwater 
Diversion Canal at Bayou Lamoque in Plaquemines Parish (May 12, 2010), available at 
http://emergency. louisiana.gov/Releases/05122010-Lamoque.html [hereinafter Press 
Release, Plaquemines Parish]. 
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(1) Davis Pond Diversion: St. Charles Parish; 
(2) Violet Siphon: St. Bernard Parish; 
(3) Caernarvon Diversion: St. Bernard Parish; 
(4) Whites Ditch Siphon: Plaquemines Parish; 
(5) Naomi Siphon: Plaquemines Parish; 
(6) West Pointe A la Hache Siphon: Plaquemines Parish; and 
(7) Bayou Lamoque Diversion: Plaquemines Parish.86 
The diversions, which are located on both the east and west sides of the 
Mississippi River, diverted water into the northern Barataria Basin87 and 
the adjacent wetlands to Breton Sound and Black Bay.88   
Through these press releases, OCPR made it clear that it thought 
opening these diversions was necessary to protect Louisiana’s coastal 
resources.  OCPR Assistant Director Jerome Zeringue stated, "[w]e have 
opened every diversion structure we control on the state and parish level 
to try to limit the oil approaching our coasts."89  Robert Barham, 
Secretary of the LDWF, stated that "[t]he potential effects of this oil spill 
could last for decades, so we are using every means at our disposal to try 
to lessen the devastation the oil could inflict on our wetlands."90  Garret 
Graves, Chairman of the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority, stated:  
Oil has made its way west of the Mississippi River and we 
are using every tool we have available to try and protect our 
coastal resources.  We have been using diversions, siphons 
and locks on both the east and west side for more than 10 
days to try and push the oil away from our coastal wetlands. 
The Barataria Basin is a maze of marshy islands, grass beds, 
bayous, ponds and lakes. It will be nearly impossible for us 
to clean the oil out of these areas for years if it gets in 
there.91 
                                            
 86. Id.  In addition to these seven diversions, Louisiana also flushed freshwater 
through Ostrica Locks. 
 87. See Press Release, Davis Pond Diversion, supra note 84.  
 88. See Press Release, Plaquemines Parish, supra note 85.  Four of the diversions are 
in Plaquemines Parish, three are located in St. Bernard Parish, and one is located in St. 
Charles Parish.  Id. 
 89. Press Release, Additional Freshwater Diversions, supra note 81.   
 90. Press Release, Plaquemines Parish, supra note 85. 
 91. Id. 
40 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1 
 
In addition, the OCPR stated that they would “continue to closely 
monitor coastal conditions and will assess any potential damage to 
wetlands as impacts are reported.”92 
B. The Effect on Oysters 
Parties are in disagreement as to the effectiveness of the freshwater 
flushing.  The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling stated in its report to President Obama (the 
Presidential Report) that many parties believe that the diversions were “a 
futile attempt to keep oil from entering the estuarine areas.”93  However, 
other sources state that most accounts claim that the diversions were 
successful in allowing only a minimal amount of oil into Louisiana’s 
estuaries.94  Despite the disagreement concerning the diversions’ 
effectiveness, the freshwater diversions appear to be another response 
effort that could result in its own environmental damage.95   
Many scientists believe that the diversions are the cause of massive 
oyster mortality in Louisiana’s marshes, because the flushing of 
freshwater into these areas reduced the salinity of the water in the 
marshes.96  Seawater usually has a salinity of about “[thirty-five] parts 
salt per thousand parts water.”97  However, many of the most productive 
waters for oysters in Louisiana have a salinity of about fifteen parts salt 
per thousand parts water.98  In fact, oysters usually require a salinity level 
between five to fifteen parts per thousand.99  Although oysters can 
survive a fluctuation in salinity, they cannot do so for an extended period 
of time.100  When salinity levels drop below five parts per thousand, the 
salt level is too low for the survival of larvae and adult oysters and for 
young oysters to attach to the oysters beds.101  After the diversions were 
started, Earl Melancon, a biologist at Nicholls State University located in 
Thibodaux, Louisiana, has said that the salinity levels in some areas of 
                                            
 92. Press Release, Additional Freshwater Diversions, supra note 86. 
 93. DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 27, at 178. 
 94. Ball, supra note 18. 
 95. Id.  Other response efforts that could have adverse environmental impacts include 
the use of dispersants and the building of sand berms off the Louisiana coast, which some 
believe could actually increase coastal erosion.  Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14. 
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Barataria Bay were below five parts per thousand, a salinity level that 
oysters would have difficulty surviving.102 
Once the freshwater diversions had begun, scientists and oystermen 
observed large numbers of empty, flapping oyster shells in Louisiana’s 
oyster grounds, which meant that the oysters inside were dead.103  
Further, these parties have observed large amounts of oyster mortality in 
parts of Louisiana where oil from the Spill never reached, leading many 
to believe that the deaths were caused by the freshwater diversions.104  
Patrick Banks, who oversees the oyster fishery in Louisiana as a biologist 
for LDWF, said LDWF conducted tests in an extremely productive part 
of Barataria Bay and found that around sixty percent of the oysters in the 
area had died.105  Banks also described an oyster die-off as looking “like 
a fish kill” with oyster meat floating on the water’s surface in such large 
quantities “that the predators that normally would eat up the oyster meat 
just couldn’t keep up.”106  Melancon also found dead oysters in Barataria 
Bay, and stated that dead oysters had also been found in Breton Sound.107 
Melancon has claimed that he is “fairly confident” that the 
freshwater diversions caused the oyster deaths that he observed.108  The 
Presidential Report stated that “[o]yster mortality observed in the highly 
productive areas of Barataria Bay and Breton Sound . . . appear to be 
due, in large part, to the flood of fresh water introduced through river 
diversions . . . .”109  A Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority spokesman has claimed that it is “obvious” that the diversions 
resulted in a reduced salinity level in some of the state’s oyster beds; 
however, the spokesman also claimed that the diversions were just one of 
the factors that could have contributed to the lower salinity levels, as 
other factors such as rain and the river’s natural flow could also have 
been contributors.110  After the diversions, a BP spokesman refused to 
comment on whether they would pay for oyster deaths caused by the 
freshwater diversions.111  
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John W. Tunnell, Jr. prepared an expert report on the expected 
recovery of the seafood industry in the Gulf.112  In his opinion, Tunnell 
discusses oysters in the Gulf and the impact of the Spill on oysters.113  
Tunnell states that “[t]oo much freshwater will kill oysters, although they 
can tolerate some freshwater flooding from time to time.”114  However, 
Tunnell also states that oyster reefs can quickly recolonize due to the 
large number of eggs and larvae produced by a single spawn.115  In 
conclusion, Tunnell claims that oyster harvesting in 2011 in the northern 
Gulf will follow the trends of recent years.116  Further, Tunnell states that 
unless there are “large scale flooding events in 2011,” oyster reefs that 
were damaged by freshwater diversions “should be recolonized by young 
oysters in 2011 . . . but they will not likely be of harvestable size until 
late 2012 or 2013.”117 
III. ALTERNATIVE RECOVERY OPTIONS 
Those who suffered damage due to the Spill faced several choices in 
how they would like to recover their losses.  Many claims for damages 
have been processed by the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), which 
paid out over $6 billion on more than 220,000 claims following the Spill 
before being replaced by a court-supervised claims process in June 
2012.118  The GCCF was set up pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA).119  Under OPA, a responsible party who discharges oil from a 
vessel or facility is liable for the removal costs and damages that result 
from the discharge.120  The responsible party is liable for, among other 
costs, damages in connection with real or personal property, lost revenue 
                                            
 112. JOHN W. TUNNELL, JR., AN EXPERT OPINION OF WHEN THE GULF OF MEXICO WILL 
RETURN TO PRE-SPILL HARVEST STATUS FOLLOWING THE BP DEEPWATER HOIZON MC 252 
OIL SPILL (2011), available at http://media.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/other/Tunnell-
GCCF-Final-Report.pdf.  
 113. Id. at 29. 
 114. Id. at 30. 
 115. Id. at 30-31.  In addition, Tunnell points out that although oysters can be “tolerant 
of light to medium oiling,” without detailed oiling maps, it is difficult to determine the 
exact amount of oiling that oysters received in specific areas. Id. 
 116. Id. at 32. 
 117. Id. at 32-33.  Tunnell states that oyster reefs that were heavily oiled might “not 
recover for 6-8, even 10 years.” Id. 
 118. Kunzelman, supra note 2. 
 119. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY ADVANCE PAYMENTS 
(2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/library/ 
assets/gccf-emergency-advance-payments.pdf. 
 120. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (2006).  
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and profits, and hindered earning capacity.121  Under OPA, all claims for 
costs or damages must first be presented to the responsible party.122  
After presenting a claim to the responsible party, if the claimant 
disagrees with the responsible party’s denial of the claim or 
determination of the amount owed, the claimant may present a claim to 
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, administered by the National Pollution 
Funds Center.123  This action is also available if the responsible party has 
failed to act within ninety days after the claimant presented the claim.124 
After the Spill, the U.S. Coast Guard designated BP as a responsible 
party under OPA.125  BP, as required by OPA, set up a procedure for 
paying and settling claims for damages and costs incurred because of the 
Spill.126  However, the White House announced on June 16, 2010 that BP 
would replace the claims process with the GCCF and establish a $20 
billion escrow fund to pay for claims under OPA.127  The GCCF 
reviewed individuals’ and businesses’ claims for damages and costs 
incurred due to the Spill.128  Under the GCCF, an individual or business 
could make a claim for Emergency Advance Payments, Quick Payment 
Final Payments, Full Review Final Payments, or Interim Payments.129   
Oystermen who sustained damage due to the freshwater diversions 
after the Spill could make a Final Claim to the GCCF because the Final 
Rules Governing Payment Options, Eligibility and Substantiation 
Criteria, and Final Payment Methodology (Final Rules), specifically 
mentioned damage caused by the freshwater diversions.130  The Final 
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Rules stated that claimants who had losses due to the freshwater 
diversions were entitled to a Final Payment “equal to four times the 
actual documented losses in 2010.”131  However, oystermen who 
sustained this type of damage may have felt that they would be 
inadequately compensated by the GCCF; many oystermen were confused 
by the GCCF process and were unsure of how to calculate their losses.132  
Further, though the Final Rules mention damage caused by freshwater 
diversions, the claimants who sustained this type of damage may not 
have been able to adequately document their claim to the GCCF.133  
Claimants who had inadequate documentation had the option of 
receiving a “Quick Payment,” which required no additional 
documentation, as long as they had previously received an Interim 
Payment or an Emergency Advance Payment.134  
To receive most payments under the GCCF, claimants had to sign a 
waiver.135  To receive a Quick Payment Final Claim, claimants had to 
release and waive any future claims against BP and any other potentially 
responsible party in connection to the Spill “or to submit any claim for 
payment to the National Pollution Funds Center, the Coast Guard office 
responsible for evaluating and approving Oil Pollution Act claims, or in 
court.”136  Similarly, to receive a Final Payment from the GCCF, the 
claimant had “to sign a release precluding the claimant from seeking 
further compensation from the GCCF, the Coast Guard, or in court from 
either BP or any other defendant company allegedly responsible for the 
Oil Spill.”137  Since Interim Payments only covered documented past 
                                            
 131. Id.  
 132. Nikki Buskey, Oysterman Say Oil-Spill Claims Process Unclear, HOUMATODAY 
(Nov. 7, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20101107/ARTICLES/ 
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 133. Because the oystermen “are located in the immediate vicinity of the Gulf shore . . . 
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FINAL RULES, supra note 130, at 7 (emphasis in original). In the same paragraph 
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 134. Id. at 8.  Quick Payments were in the amount of $5,000 for individuals and 
$25,000 for businesses.  Id. 
 135. See id. at 2, 8. 
 136. See id. at 1-2, 8. 
 137. Id. at 2. 
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damages, a claimant was not required to sign a release and thus retained 
all of his or her litigation rights.138   
Under the Final Rules, it does not appear that oystermen had to 
choose between either making a claim to the GCCF or pursuing a takings 
claim in court.139  Although to collect most claims under the GCCF 
claimants had to give up a lot of their future litigation rights by signing a 
broad release, the releases did not cover claims against the state or 
federal government.140  The Final Rules only mentioned a release that 
would preclude claimants from seeking additional “compensation from 
the GCCF, the Coast Guard, or in court from either BP or any other 
defendant companies allegedly responsible for the Oil Spill.”141  Because 
the State of Louisiana and the United States are not mentioned among the 
parties released, oystermen who collected under the GCCF could still 
pursue a takings claim against the United States and Louisiana.142 
If an oysterman either disagreed with the GCCF’s denial of his or her 
claim or the GCCF’s determination of the amount payable to the 
claimant, or if the GCCF failed to act within ninety days after the 
oysterman presented the claim, then the claimant could submit the claim 
to the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC).143  Unlike the GCCF, the 
NPFC will not pay any amount for future or speculative damages, and 
the NPFC requires a claimant to release “all rights to recover the amount 
paid on that claim from responsible parties and from any person under 
any other law consistent with provisions of OPA.”144  However, a 
claimant does not have to release his or her rights to any claim for 
damages or removal costs that are not included in the NPFC’s payment 
to the claimant.145  Further, a claimant must bring a claim for damages 
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within three years after the injury and the connection to the Spill are 
“reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due care.”146  
Similarly, the oystermen could bring a claim for damages against BP 
in court. 147  For example, the oystermen could join the multidistrict 
litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana.148 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
has approved a settlement for spill-related claims in the above 
multidistrict litigation.149  The court set a deadline of January 22, 2013 
for claimants to join the settlement for seafood claims.150  Recently the 
U.S. District Court judge overseeing the litigation denied a motion to 
extend the deadline to join the seafood settlement.151  Although the rest 
of the settlement does not have a cap, the seafood claims, which cover 
seafood vessel owners, seafood boat crews and captains, commercial 
fishermen and oyster leaseholders, are capped at $2.3 billion.152  Overall, 
the settlement process in this litigation has led to BP paying more than 
$1 billion for claims, and BP estimates that the amount will reach around 
$7.8 billion once the process is complete.153 
IV. TAKINGS CLAIMS 
Both the Federal Court of Claims and the Louisiana Supreme Court 
have decided cases that addressed oyster mortality due to the freshwater 
diversion systems in Louisiana.154  A background of takings law and 
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federal and state cases that addressed oyster mortality due to freshwater 
diversions are discussed in turn below. 
A. Takings Generally 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”155  The first part of the Fifth Amendment is known as the 
Due Process Clause.156  The second part constrains the government’s use 
of its power of eminent domain and is known as the Takings Clause.157 
Eminent domain is an inherent government power to take privately 
owned property for a public use without the owner’s consent, subject to 
constitutional and statutory limitations.158  Because it is an inherent 
power, the power of eminent domain does not need to be granted to the 
government by statutes or the Constitution; therefore, the U.S. 
Constitution does not grant to the federal government the power of 
eminent domain.159  Rather, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution provides protection to property owners by stating that the 
government can only take privately owned property without the property 
owner’s consent if: (1) the government is taking the property for a public 
purpose, and (2) the government pays just compensation to the property 
owner.160  Therefore, the only time that a taking will be considered 
unconstitutional is if the taking is not for a public use, even if 
compensation is provided, or if the compensation provided is not 
adequate.161   
The purpose of this takings clause in the Fifth Amendment is to keep 
the government from placing an unfair burden on private property 
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owners when the public should be bearing the burden.162  There are two 
types of takings.163  The first category is physical takings, which is where 
the government either obtains title to the property, known as 
condemnation, or physically invades private property without providing 
just compensation to the owner, known as inverse condemnation.164  
However, the Fifth Amendment does not simply protect property owners 
from the government invading, occupying, or removing property.165  
Rather, it also protects against government regulatory action that 
diminishes the usefulness of private property, which is known as a 
regulatory taking.166  A regulatory taking occurs when the government 
burdens private property with a regulation to such an extent that the 
regulation has the same effect on the property as if the government had 
physically taken the property.167  Put simply, if the regulation goes “too 
far,” it will constitute a taking.168  
Although a regulation can amount to a taking, states and local 
governments have broad legislative power to regulate land use through 
the police power, which allows a state to enact regulations to protect the 
health, safety, and general welfare of the community.169  In addition to 
the police power, the government may also act to protect the state’s 
interest in submerged and public trust lands.170  
By exercising these powers, the government may create conflicts 
with property owners who might challenge the regulation.171  Under the 
police power, a court will presume that a land use regulation is valid and 
will only declare a regulation to be unconstitutional if it is clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, with no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, or welfare of the community.172  Further, as stated above, 
if a land use regulation "goes too far," a court may consider it to be a 
regulatory taking.173   
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Courts have been unwilling to set hard and fast rules regarding 
whether a property restriction by the government constitutes a taking.174  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has created certain categories of cases 
that are considered per se takings.175  First, if the government physically 
invades a person’s property on a permanent basis, the government has 
taken the property and must provide just compensation to the property 
owner.176  Second, if the government action keeps the owner from using 
his or her property in any economically beneficial way, the government 
has taken the property with what is known as a “total regulatory 
taking.”177 
Outside of these two per se regulatory takings, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has also developed an analysis for land-use exactions, which 
involve situations when the government seeks to impose a condition on 
the property owner in exchange for authorizing a land use that it has 
restricted otherwise.178  The Court laid out the test for whether an 
exaction amounts to a taking in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission179 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.180 In Nollan, the Court 
created what is known as the “essential nexus” test, which requires a 
condition in the permit to serve “the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban.”181  In Dolan, the Court added to the “essential nexus” 
test by requiring a “rough proportionality” between the proposed 
development’s impact and the condition.182  The lower courts have split 
on whether the Nollan and Dolan tests should be applied to situations 
outside of the facts of those cases, such as cases where the exaction does 
not involve dedications of real property or in cases when a permit is 
never issued, but the Supreme Court ruled during its 2013 term that 
Nollan and Dolan could be applied to these situations.183  
If a government action limits the use of property and does not fall 
within one of the above categories, a court will apply the three-part test 
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established by the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City,184 known as the “Penn Central 
Test.”185  Under the Penn Central Test, a court will analyze “the 
character of the governmental action.”186  For example, a court might 
look at whether the government has physically invaded the property or 
otherwise impacted the property.187  A court will also examine “the 
economic impact on the claimant.”188  Importantly, a court will analyze 
“the extent to which the governmental action had interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations.”189  However, the Penn Central Test is 
not a set formula and the Court intended for the test to be used by courts 
as guidance in their analysis of whether there is a taking due to a 
government’s restriction on the use of property.190 
B. Federal Claims 
As discussed in Part I.A above, oyster leases are recognized property 
rights in Louisiana that are protectable from injury or damage done by 
third parties.191  Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, state-created property 
rights are protected from uncompensated takings by the state or federal 
government.192  In Avenal v. United States,193 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit determined whether damage done to oyster beds 
due to freshwater diversions, which were initiated to combat coastal 
erosion and changed salinity levels at the Caernarvon diversion project, 
constituted a taking by the government.194 
The court first established that the intent of the government in its 
development of the Caernarvon project was not to occupy or use the 
plaintiffs’ oyster lease beds for government purposes but, rather, to limit 
the plaintiffs’ use of the oyster beds.195  Further, the court concluded that 
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the limits imposed by the government substantially reduced the 
plaintiffs’ property values.196   
In the case, the court examined the oystermen’s claims using the 
Penn Central test.197  In determining that there was no taking by the 
government, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have 
“reasonable investment-backed expectations” that their property interests 
in their oyster lease beds would be protected from the state and federal 
governments’ planned diversions of freshwater.198  An issue for the court 
in determining that the plaintiffs did not have investment-backed 
expectations was that the plaintiffs had not established how long they 
had held their oyster leases.199  This led the court to assume that none of 
the plaintiffs held leases prior to 1976, which the court calculated by 
subtracting fifteen years, which is the term of oyster leases in Louisiana, 
from 1991, the date when the government began operating the freshwater 
diversions at the Caernarvon project.200  Because the state and federal 
governments had been planning the freshwater diversion projects since 
the 1950s and 1960s, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not have 
reasonable investment-backed expectations to be protected from the state 
and federal governments’ planned freshwater diversions, because the 
diversions were planned prior to when the plaintiffs were assumed to 
have entered their leases.201  The court stated that the “plaintiffs as a 
matter of law must be assumed to have known that their rights to use 
bottom-lands for oystering were subject to the inevitable changes that the 
anticipated government program would bring about.”202  
Another factor in the court’s decision was the fact that plaintiffs’ 
oyster leases were in an area that was previously unsuitable for oyster 
cultivation.203  The court stated that the plaintiffs were entitled to take 
advantage of the changing salinity levels caused, at least partly, by 
government actions in building the Mississippi levee system, for their 
economic benefit by obtaining leases in these areas.204  However, the 
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court further elaborated that the plaintiffs could not be surprised that the 
government would again tamper with the area’s salinity levels.205 
Finally, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs possessed valuable 
state-created property rights that were entitled to constitutional 
protection, such as protection from unlawful pollution.206  Interestingly, 
in dictum, the court also claimed that the hold-harmless clauses in some 
of the plaintiffs’ oyster leases did not change the fact that the state and 
federal governments’ actions had restrained the plaintiffs’ use of their 
property.207  However, as discussed above, the court ruled that this 
restraint did not amount to an unconstitutional taking.208 
C. Louisiana Claims 
Since the Louisiana Constitution distinguishes between property that 
is “taken” and property that is “damaged,” what is considered a taking 
under the Louisiana Constitution is narrower than what is considered a 
taking under the U.S. Constitution.209  Under the Louisiana Constitution  
[e]very person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, 
protect, and dispose of private property.  This right is subject to 
reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of 
the police power. . . . Property shall not be taken or damaged by 
the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes 
and with just compensation.210 
Moreover, a claimant must bring a takings claim within three years under 
the statutory law of Louisiana, but a claimant must bring a damages 
claim within two years under Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana 
Constitution.211 
In Avenal v. State, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled on the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the Louisiana Constitution.212  The court applied 
a three-part test to analyze “whether a claimant is entitled to eminent 
domain compensation.”213  Under the three-part test, a court shall:  “(1) 
determine if a recognized species of property right has been affected; (2) 
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if it is determined that property is involved, decide whether the property 
has been taken or damaged in a constitutional sense; and (3) determine 
whether the taking or damaging is for a public purpose under Article I, § 
4.”214 
However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana determined the three-part 
test was not necessary because the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.215  
As takings and damages claims have different prescription periods under 
Article I, Section 4, the court stated that it was necessary to determine 
whether the plaintiffs’ claims were takings or damages claims.216  The 
plaintiffs’ claims were for damages, which are subject to a two-year 
prescription period, because the property suffered a diminution in 
property value due to government action.217  In Louisiana, the 
prescription period for damages claims starts “to run after the completion 
and acceptance of the public works.”218  As a result, the court ruled that 
the prescription period began to run when the Caernarvon project became 
operational in 1991, which effectively time-barred the plaintiffs’ 
claims.219 
Regardless of the prescription period, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana also ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation 
for a majority of their claims because the leases contained hold-harmless 
clauses that released Louisiana from damage caused by coastal diversion 
projects.220  This rationale differed from the federal court’s dictum that 
the hold-harmless clauses did not change that the government had 
restrained the plaintiffs’ use of the property.221  In holding that the hold-
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harmless clauses were valid, the court stated the clauses were necessary 
to the oyster industry’s development.222  Moreover, the court reasoned 
the clauses were allowed under the public trust doctrine, which required 
the state to protect Louisiana’s coastline.223  The public trust doctrine, 
furthermore, required Louisiana to go forward with its coastal restoration 
projects, including the planned freshwater diversions and “the 
redistribution of existing productive oyster beds to other areas . . . in 
[pursuit] of this goal.”224 
V. RECOVERY UNDER TAKINGS CLAIMS 
In order to succeed in a takings claim, the oystermen who suffered 
damage due to freshwater diversions after the Spill will have to 
distinguish their cases from the Avenal decisions in state and federal 
court.  As will be discussed below, the facts surrounding these freshwater 
diversions are distinguishable from the Avenal decisions.  However, even 
though the facts are distinguishable, the oystermen will still have to 
overcome some obstacles to succeed on a takings claim.   
First, the oystermen may be able to distinguish their claims from the 
facts underlying the Avenal decisions and make a better case that they 
had reasonable investment-backed expectations.  The court considered 
deliberate diversions in the Avenal decisions, whereas the freshwater 
diversions after the Spill were not the planned, as the freshwater 
diversions began only ten days after the Spill and were not part of the 
general coastal restoration plans of Louisiana.225  Further, the freshwater 
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diversion systems were put on full blast after the Spill, which had never 
happened before in the history of the systems.226   
In addition, the oystermen had been raising and cultivating oysters 
for many years in these areas, even though the coastal restoration 
freshwater diversions had been operational since the early 1990s.227  
Moreover, if the oystermen who sustained damage are able to show how 
long they have held their oyster leases, they will be able to distinguish 
the facts of their situation from the facts in the Avenal decisions.  
However, even if the facts are distinguishable from the facts in the 
Avenal decisions, there are still roadblocks to the oystermen’s recovery 
under takings claims. 
A. State Claims 
Although the freshwater diversions were not deliberate diversions, 
like those in the Avenal decisions, the hold-harmless clauses that barred 
most of the claims in the Avenal state decision may still apply.  The hold-
harmless clauses that are included in oyster leases under Louisiana law 
hold harmless state and federal actors from actions taken “in furtherance 
of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration,” which include acts to 
protect the state’s coastline, wetlands, and coastal resources.228  The 
Louisiana OCPR’s press releases announcing the opening of the 
freshwater diversion systems after the Spill stated the diversions were 
used to protect the state’s coastal resources.229  In addition, the LDWF 
stated that the diversions were an effort to keep oil from damaging 
Louisiana’s wetlands.230  Thus, there is evidence that Louisiana and the 
Corps acted within the terms of the hold-harmless clause currently found 
in all Louisiana oyster leases. 
Moreover, even though state statutory law provides that the hold-
harmless clause covers state and federal actions taken pursuant to “any 
comprehensive coastal protection master plan or annual coastal 
protection plan,” the state statutes also indicate the actions covered by 
the hold-harmless clause are not limited to actions taken under these 
plans.231  Therefore, the fact that these diversions were not taken 
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according to any coastal restoration plan does not mean that they fall 
outside of the scope of the hold-harmless clauses found in Louisiana 
oyster leases. 
Further, even if the oystermen are able to distinguish their cases from 
the Avenal state decision, to the extent that the state court finds that the 
hold-harmless clauses do not apply, the oystermen’s claims may still be 
time-barred.  The Avenal state decision remains good law in Louisiana 
and the case clearly holds that claims for damage done to oyster beds due 
to freshwater diversions have a two-year prescription period.232  Further, 
the Avenal state decision provided that the prescription period began “to 
run after the completion and acceptance of the public works,” which the 
court determined was 1991.233  Under the court’s reasoning in the Avenal 
state decision, the oystermen’s claims for damage done by the freshwater 
diversions after the Spill may have been time-barred in 1993, seventeen 
years before the oystermen sustained damage by the Spill. 
In order to overcome the prescription clock of the Avenal state 
decision, the oystermen would have to argue that the freshwater 
diversions were so outside the scope of the freshwater diversion system’s 
use under Louisiana’s coastal restoration plan, and that the prescription 
period should not have begun to run until the oystermen sustained 
damage after the Spill.  Unfortunately, even if the court was persuaded to 
reset the clock for the oystermen’s damages claims, their claims are most 
likely still time-barred.  The prescription period for damages claims in 
Louisiana is two years, and the damage the oystermen sustained from the 
freshwater diversions occurred in 2010, more than two years ago.234  
Thus, the prescription period serves as a giant roadblock for oystermen’s 
claims in Louisiana state courts.   
B. Federal Claims 
At first glance, the oystermen may have an easier case to make in 
federal court.  In the Avenal federal decision, the Court of Federal Claims 
stated in dictum that the hold-harmless clauses in the oyster leases did 
not change the fact that the state and federal governments had restrained 
the plaintiffs’ use of their property.235  Although the court only stated this 
in dictum, it is still evidence that a federal court would not consider the 
hold-harmless clauses to be a bar to the oystermen’s takings claims. 
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In addition, the oystermen’s claims may not be time-barred in federal 
court.  Under the Tucker Act, claimants should file takings claims 
against the government in the Court of Federal Claims.236  The statute of 
limitations for these claims is six years and, in a recent decision, 
Northwest Louisiana Fish & Game Preserve Commission v. United 
States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated 
that a takings claim begins to accrue when the claimant actually suffers 
damage.237  In that case, the court reasoned a takings claim accrues when 
the events that allegedly set the government’s liability have occurred and 
the claimant knew or should have known of the existence of the 
events.238  Thus, a takings claim does not accrue while there is the threat 
of future harm, and the possibility that there may be a future taking does 
not support a present takings claim.239   
The facts in Northwest Louisiana Fish are similar to the facts 
supporting the oystermen’s potential claims in response to the freshwater 
diversions after the Spill.  In Northwest Louisiana Fish, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the claimant’s takings claim 
did not accrue when the Corps took action that threatened harm in the 
future, but accrued only when the harm to the claimant actually 
occurred.240  Like the claimant in Northwest Louisiana Fish, the 
oystermen could similarly argue that though the diversion systems 
became operational in the early 1990s, the diversion systems at that 
moment only threatened future harm to the oystermen.  Thus, the 
oystermen could argue their takings claims did not accrue until they 
actually sustained harm, which was when their oysters sustained damage 
due to the freshwater diversions after the Spill. 
Similarly, another recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims 
would support the oystermen’s argument that their claims are not time-
barred.  In George Family Trust v. United States, the court held that the 
claimant’s takings claim had not accrued because the flooding of the 
claimant’s property was not foreseeable until the Corps “unpredictably 
changed” the flooding patterns, “thereby impacting what previously had 
been a viable agricultural enterprise despite historical flooding.”241  
Unlike George Family Trust, the oystermen could argue that their 
takings claims did not accrue when the Corps began operating their 
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diversion systems.  Instead, the oystermen could contend that they had 
been viably raising oysters while the Corps had been operating these 
diversion systems since the early 1990s, and that their claims began to 
accrue only when the government changed their usual freshwater 
diversion patterns after the Spill and operated the diversion systems at 
full capacity, which damaged their property.  Under these previous cases, 
the oystermen would have until sometime in 2016 to file their federal 
claims, depending on when they actually sustained damage from the 
freshwater diversions after the Spill.242 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also decided cases after the federal 
Avenal decision that could aid the oystermen’s claims.  Although not 
directly on point, the oystermen could state that by analogy, their case is 
similar to when the government takes property by temporarily flooding 
land.  The Court recently decided Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. 
United States, a temporary takings case that involved the flooding of a 
wildlife management area by the Corps where the Court held that 
flooding should not be treated differently than other takings claims.243  
The case involved release rates that were temporary deviations from the 
regular operation plan of the dam.244  These deviations caused flooding 
that led to damage to the timber in the wildlife management area, while 
the normal release rates had not caused similar damage in the past.245  
Despite the fact that in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission the 
temporary deviations flooded land,246 while the freshwater diversions 
after the Spill damaged submerged oysters,247 the facts of the two cases 
are very similar.  Like in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the 
normal freshwater diversions rates of the coastal restoration plan allowed 
the oystermen to successfully raise oysters; however, when the 
deviations from the usual diversion rates occurred during the Spill, their 
property sustained damage.248 
In ruling that temporary flooding could be a taking, the Court 
overturned the decision of the U.S.  Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which ruled that the temporary deviations from the dam’s 
operating plan that had flooded the claimant’s property could not amount 
to a taking, because in order to establish a takings claim for intermittent 
flooding, a claimant must show that the flooding is “inevitably 
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recurring.”249  The Court disagreed with this analysis, stating that 
flooding should not be treated differently than other types of takings.250  
Rather, the Court reiterated that such claims should be decided on a case-
by-case basis and remanded the case to be decided using the Penn 
Central Test.251   
The Court specified some factors that the lower court could take into 
account in deciding whether a taking had occurred, such as “the degree 
to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of 
authorized government action . . . the character of the land at issue and 
the owner’s ‘reasonable investment-backed expectations . . . as well as 
the severity of the interference.’”252 Particularly, the Court pointed out 
that though the damaged area was in a floodplain and had experienced 
past flooding, the area “had not been exposed to flooding comparable to 
the 1990’s accumulations in any other time span prior to or after the 
construction of the Dam.”253   
Although Arkansas Game & Fish Commission involves flooding and 
damage on land, while the oystermen here sustained damage to 
oysterbeds on submerged land, the oystermen have a comparable 
situation because the diversions after the Spill were abnormal and not 
part of the overall coastal restoration plan of Louisiana.254  However, it is 
not clear how persuasive a court will find Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission since the Court did not do a takings analysis in the decision 
and only ruled that a taking could have occurred.255  In deciding whether 
to bring a similar claim as Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the 
oystermen may want to follow how the lower federal court evaluates the 
Commission’s temporary takings claim.  If the decision turns out 
favorably and the court finds that a temporary taking occurred, the 
oystermen may want to make a similar temporary takings argument in 
their claims. 
The oystermen could also potentially use Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission to combat some of the reasoning of the federal Avenal 
decision that discussed the foreseeability of the oystermen’s claims.256  
The court in the federal Avenal decision stated that since the plaintiffs 
were taking advantage of an area that was previously unsuitable for 
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oyster cultivation, they could not expect that the government would not 
tamper with salinity levels in the future.257  The oystermen here could 
argue that the freshwater diversions after the Spill were not foreseeable, 
as they were much greater than any previous diversions in the history of 
the diversion system.258  As stated above, the Court pointed out in 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission that though the damaged area was 
in a floodplain and had experienced past flooding, the area “had not been 
exposed to flooding comparable to the 1990’s accumulations in any other 
time span prior to or after the construction of the Dam.”259  The 
oystermen could claim that a gradual change in salinity brought on by an 
incremental change in the amount of freshwater being released from the 
diversion projects would be foreseeable; this type of change could be 
planned for and the oystermen could take the appropriate steps to move 
their leases.  On the other hand, the sudden, large changes in the amount 
of freshwater released after the Spill that had an immediate effect on 
salinity and oyster health were not foreseeable.260  Thus, the claimant 
could argue, foreseeability should not serve as a bar to their claims.261 
Another U.S. Supreme Court case decided after the federal Avenal 
decision may also be of use to the oystermen.  In Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, the Court considered the takings claim of a property owner who 
obtained title to the property in question after the government had passed 
a regulation restricting the use of the property.262  In 1978, the Rhode 
Island Coastal Resources Management Council (Council) passed 
regulations that designated salt marshes as protected wetlands, greatly 
restricting the amount of development that could occur on the 
property.263  In 1978, the corporation who held the property lost its 
corporate charter and the title to the property passed to Palazzolo, the 
corporation’s sole shareholder, who subsequently made several 
applications to the Council to develop the property.264  The Council 
rejected these applications, believing that the development would violate 
the salt marsh regulations, which prompted Palazzolo to file a takings 
claim.265  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that since the salt marsh 
regulations existed before Palazzolo obtained title to the property, he 
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could not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation to develop 
his property under the Penn Central Test.266 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the Rhode 
Island court and held that the fact that Palazzolo obtained title to the 
property after the Council enacted the salt marsh regulations could not 
serve as a bar to his takings claim.267  The Court reasoned that 
governments should not be able to put an expiration date on takings 
claims by barring claims by property owners who obtained title to 
property after a regulation was enacted, and doing so, the Court stated, 
would absolve the government from the obligation of defending its 
actions, “no matter how extreme or unreasonable.”268  In doing so, the 
Court rejected the lower court’s ruling stating that “[a] purchaser or a 
successive title holder like the petitioner is deemed to have notice of an 
earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a 
taking.”269  The Court remanded the case to be determined under the 
Penn Central factors.270 
The oystermen here could use Palazzolo to combat the reasoning of 
the federal Avenal decision where the court determined that the 
oystermen could not have reasonable investment-backed expectations, 
because they could not establish that they held their oyster leases prior to 
when the government began planning the freshwater diversion projects, 
and therefore, could not expect protection from the projects’ planned 
freshwater diversions.  The oystermen could argue that under Palazzolo, 
this fact should not serve as an outright ban on their claims, but rather, 
should only be one factor weighed in the Penn Central analysis. 
Even if a court finds both Arkansas Game & Fish Commission and 
Palazzolo to be persuasive and the oystermen here have been able to 
distinguish their claims from the previous federal Avenal decision, the 
oystermen will still have to contend with the fact that the federal Avenal 
decision remains good law.  Recently, the Court of Federal Claims 
decided a case in which the claimant brought a takings claim based on 
the Corps’ discharge of polluted freshwater from a lake into a river in 
Florida.271  In that case, the Court of Federal Claims cited the federal 
Avenal decision in finding that the claimants did not have a right to bring 
a takings claim based on the discharge of freshwater into the river, which 
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altered the river’s salinity level.272  Even though, in Avenal, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not have reasonable 
investment-backed expectations and that not all takings claims based on 
changed salinity levels would fail, the oystermen could face a similar 
interpretation of the Avenal decision by the Court of Federal Claims in its 
review of the oystermen’s claims.  
Finally, oystermen should consider how a federal court might 
examine the oystermen’s claims under the Penn Central Test.  As stated 
above, the oystermen here have a stronger case that these diversions were 
unforeseeable than the Avenal plaintiffs did, since the diversions after the 
Spill were not part of the normal operation of the diversion systems.  
Further, the oystermen could use Palazzolo to argue that the fact that 
they obtained their leases after the diversion systems were being planned 
or operated should not serve as a bar to their claims.  Moreover, if an 
oysterman could show that his or her lease dated back to before the 
planning of the diversion, which the Avenal plaintiffs were unable to do, 
he or she would have an even stronger case that he or she had a 
reasonable investment-backed expectation. 
How a court might weigh the facts of the oystermen’s claims under 
the Penn Central Test is uncertain, however, as there is no set formula 
for examining takings cases.  Because of this, it is often hard to predict 
how a court will decide a takings claim.  In addition to the foreseeability 
and investment-backed expectations arguments discussed above, the 
court may be swayed by the circumstances surrounding the Spill.  In 
light of the fact that the Spill is an emotional event, one cannot 
underestimate how the facts of the Spill and the ecological damage that 
the Spill caused might sway a court, and any potential claimants should 
consider this factor in deciding whether to bring a takings claim.  On the 
other hand, the government stated that the freshwater diversions after the 
Spill were taken to protect the coastal resources of Louisiana.273  Given 
the chaos that occurred after the Spill, a court may find that the 
government’s actions here were properly within the government’s police 
power and duty under the public trust doctrine, and that the actions did 
not go “too far.”  In deciding whether to bring a takings claim, a potential 
claimant should not fail to consider the unpredictability of how a court 
may view a takings claim. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, outside of the BP settlement process, the oystermen 
who suffered damage from the freshwater diversions initiated after the 
Spill may be able to bring takings claims in state and federal court, 
though a state claim is likely to be time-barred.  The previous Avenal 
decisions will be a high hurdle for these claimants to overcome, and each 
claimant will have to determine whether he or she is willing to expend 
the time and resources, both financial and emotional, that a court case 
will entail. 
The oystermen will have to distinguish the facts of their case to 
overcome the prior state decision’s holding that the Avenal plaintiffs’ 
claims were both time-barred and barred by the hold-harmless clauses in 
Louisiana oyster leases.  Even if the oystermen are able to successfully 
argue that the diversions were outside the state’s coastal restoration plan, 
the claims are most likely still time-barred.  Claims for damages in 
Louisiana have a two-year prescription period, and the damage to oysters 
by the freshwater diversions occurred more than two years ago. 
Although a federal claim may not be time-barred or barred by the 
hold-harmless clause, the oystermen would still have barriers to 
overcome in federal court.  Any potential claimants will have to argue 
that their case is distinguishable from the previous federal Avenal 
decision, and the Federal Claims Court recently cited the federal Avenal 
decision for the proposition that a claimant could not establish a takings 
claim based on changed salinity levels.274  Though the oystermen may be 
able to distinguish their cases from the facts of the Avenal decisions and 
more recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions may help aid their arguments, 
whether they will be able to overcome the precedent of these decisions is 
not certain.  Nor is one able to easily predict how a court would weigh 
the facts of this case under the Penn Central Test. 
In determining whether to bring takings claims, each oysterman will 
have to determine whether the chance that they will be able to distinguish 
their case from the Avenal decisions is worth the time, money, and 
emotional resources that litigation entails.  Oystermen should not 
underestimate the time and resources that the claimants in the Exxon 
Valdez litigation had to invest in their own court cases, and even the 
Avenal decisions took many years to be decided.  The oystermen should 
consider whether they are willing to be invested in litigation for this 
lengthy period of time and whether they are willing to risk that a court 
                                            
 274. See Mildenberger, 91 Fed. Cl. at 245. 
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will not view their claims more favorably than the courts in the Avenal 
decisions. 
 
